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I. Introduction
This contribution suggests a number of business and economic policies 
that a new government of the Somali Republic might consider in order 
to put the country on the path to successful economic reconstruction 
and development. The proposed policies are derived from a critical 
reassessment of today’s integrated and interdependent world econ-
omy, which presents both opportunities and dire threats that could 
jeopardize the sovereignty and statehood of Somalia. The crucial role 
of a good and strong government is emphasized. Recent developments 
are also integrated into the analysis. The essay concludes by suggesting 
policies for creating a business and investment climate that guides and 
regulates (but does not stifle) the entrepreneurial spirit of the Somali 
people, which has flourished for fifteen years in the absence of state 
and government.
There are unprecedented opportunities in today’s global economy 
for nations that create the right business regulatory climate and incen-
tives to attract domestic as well as foreign investments. That is the first 
order of business for a new government. The whole project of recon-
ciliation and nation-building may hinge on the successful implementa-
tion of policies that can help the Somali economy take advantage of the 
opportunities that globalization presents.
In Western industry and business theory and analysis, the state and 
its institutions are a given. Thus, Western models are not particularly 
helpful in dealing with the stateless situation that has prevailed in 
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Somalia for the last sixteen years. Nevertheless, they provide a starting 
point that permits an examination of their relevance to the Somali situ-
ation. We can thus derive policy implications grounded in the existing 
theory and the practical realities of the Somali Republic.
The remainder of the essay consists of four sections. The first dis-
cusses globalization, the criticisms leveled against it, and the economic 
development opportunities associated with it. The second and third 
sections draw on recently published research carried out under the 
auspices of the World Bank on the role that business regulations play 
in industry formation and economic development. The second section 
specifically tackles elements of the regulatory environment that gov-
ernments need to establish in their national markets in order to foster 
growth. In the third section, the focus shifts to how governments can 
create favorable investment climates for domestic and foreign inves-
tors. The fourth and final section attempts to touch upon recent politi-
cal developments. In this section, high priority issues that may need a 
new government’s immediate attention are identified.
II. Globalization and its Critics
Somalia’s civil war has roughly coincided with the flourishing of glo-
balization. Joseph Stiglitz defines globalization as “the removal of bar-
riers to free trade and the closer integration of national economies.”1 
Countries across the globe liberalized their trade and opened up their 
economies for foreign direct investments, thus making their econo-
mies more integrated with, and more dependent on, the economies 
of the rest of the world. Globalization is based on the premise that if 
countries remove trade barriers and open up their markets to foreign 
investment, their economies would specialize in those goods and ser-
vices in which they have a comparative advantage. Globalization was 
promised to lead to economic growth and poverty reduction in the 
Least Developed Countries (LDC) of the world. Under the exhorta-
tions of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (now the World Trade 
Organization, WTO), large amounts of capital have flowed from the 
rich countries of the world into developing countries to exploit the 
comparative advantages these countries have in untapped markets 
and inexpensive factors of production.
However, the promises of economic growth and poverty reduction, 
which were to result from globalization, fizzled out for the overwhelm-
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ing majority of the LDC that followed the prescriptions (the so-called 
Washington Consensus) pushed by the World Bank, IMF, and WTO. 
According to Vietor, the Washington Consensus:
prescribe[s] 10 policies for market reform: fiscal discipline, increased 
public expenditure on health and education, tax reform, interest rate 
liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, the removal of barriers to 
trade and barriers to foreign investment, privatization, deregulation, 
and secure property rights.2
In its 2004 report, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development 
demonstrates that the above prescriptions had an “immiserizing effect” 
on the economies of LDC.3 Among the disturbing findings of the report 
is that the economies of LDC are more open and more integrated with 
the rest of the world than are those of members of the Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the exclusive club 
of the rich countries of the world. Economic integration, as measured 
by the proportion of GDP that imports/exports account for, is 51% for 
LDC and 43% for the OECD. This is a clear indication that the OECD, 
which happens to be one of the major proponents of globalization, 
does not practice what it preaches.
The report, which covers the years 1999–2001, also shows that aver-
age incomes in the LDC are only slightly higher than they were in 
the 1990s, when most LDC opened up their economies. In real terms, 
average incomes in some of those countries fell below their 1990s lev-
els. Neither did increased trade improve the lot of the extremely poor 
in those countries. The countries neighboring Somalia do not seem 
to have benefited much from globalization and the economic open-
ness it champions. World Bank Development Indicators (paved roads 
in km per person, electricity consumption in kwh per person, public 
health spending per person, primary education pupil-teacher ratios) 
for Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda for the year 2003 show 
that these countries barely made any headway in a decade of unprec-
edented economic openness.4
It is expedient to scapegoat globalization for the dismal performance 
of the poor countries, but is globalization the real culprit? Globaliza-
tion has been subjected to withering criticisms from all corners. Some 
of the most visible and vociferous of these criticisms emanate from 
trade unions and other labor organizations in developed countries. 
Apart from the rhetoric of these entities, their main concerns are likely 
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to be losing jobs to developing countries when investments from their 
developed home countries seek opportunities in other parts of the 
world. Thus, many of the raucous and sometimes violent demonstra-
tions against the meetings of the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade 
Organization are organized and led by groups tied to trade unions and 
labor organizations in the developed world.
There have been, however, more serious and substantive criticisms 
against globalization and the ill effects in developing countries that are 
associated with it. Among the academic and serious critics are Stiglitz 
(2001), Rodrik (1997), and Hertz (2001). Stiglitz takes to task the supra-
national institutions: the World Bank, IMF, and WTO. A winner of the 
Nobel Prize for Economics, he speaks from a position of knowledge 
and authority. The work Globalization and its Discontents is based on 
his experiences and observations during his tenure as chief econo-
mist and senior vice president of the World Bank. Stiglitz exposes 
the hypocrisy of Western countries, which “pushed poor countries to 
eliminate trade barriers, but retained their own barriers, thus prevent-
ing developing countries from exporting their agricultural products 
and depriving them of desperately needed export income.”5 Stiglitz 
goes on to describe how the West manages the agenda of globalization 
and receives more of its benefits at the expense of poor and developing 
countries.
In response to critics of globalization, including Stiglitz, Wolf pro-
vides reasonable and logical refutations for the most common charges 
against globalization.6 Wolf accepts, however, the validity of some 
of these criticisms. Similar to Stiglitz, Wolf concedes that Developed 
Countries use multilateral agreements to impose trade liberalization 
on poor countries while keeping their own markets off limits to the 
products of the poor countries. Another criticism that the two authors 
share is that the supranational institutions entrusted with the global 
economy seem to exacerbate the situation by prescribing and imposing 
rigid and outmoded policies.
The shortcomings of the World Bank, IMF, and WTO are well docu-
mented. However, the well deserved criticisms of these institutions and 
their policies should not be confused with globalization itself. Stiglitz 
himself reiterates in his book that he still believes that globalization 
has the potential to be a force for good. The opportunities that arise 
from globalization can be pursued without following the recipes or 
prescriptions, some of which are ill conceived, of the multilateral insti-
tutions mentioned above. The example of Malaysia is a case in point. 
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Malaysia prominently rejected the IMF’s prescriptions in the aftermath 
of the financial market meltdown the Southeast Asian economies expe-
rienced in 1997,7 instituting its own homegrown policies, which helped 
it become the first country to emerge from the crisis. Moreover, if the 
rough going of the current Doha Round of the WTO is any indication, 
some of the developing countries, led by Malaysia, China, India, and 
Brazil, are finally banding together to stand up to the OECD’s hypo-
critical stance on agricultural subsidies.8
Globalization is accused of putting too much power not only in the 
hands of supranational organizations but also multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs). Hertz lists a litany of policies and tactics, both legal 
and illegal, that multinational corporations resort to in order to get 
their way with governments of developing countries.9 It is increasingly 
evident, however, that globalization has not diminished the relative 
power of the nation-state vis-à-vis MNCs, if the former plays its cards 
well. After all, the markets and resources MNCs desire are within the 
boundaries of nation-states, and their respective governments have 
control over access to them.
III. The Role of Governments
Trade liberalization and economic integration with the rest of the world 
alone are not going to meet the developmental needs of countries like 
Somalia. The countries that benefit most from the opportunities that 
globalization offers, and that are most successful in minimizing its ill 
effects, do so through the establishment of the rule of law, the avail-
ability of robust institutional arrangements of checks and balances, 
the curbing of corruption, and the maintenance of fiscal and monetary 
discipline. The Fraser Institute, a Canadian think tank, in its yearly 
report on the economic freedom of the world, argues that countries 
like Somalia need economic freedom, defined by low taxes, protec-
tion of private property, freedom of contract, free trade, and monetary 
stability, to attract investment, both domestic and foreign.10 All of the 
items that comprise the Fraser Institute’s definition of economic free-
dom require a good and strong government.
Extensive research has shown the importance of government for 
the competitiveness of nations and their economic development.11 
Research also emphasizes the importance of the regulatory role of gov-
ernments in the protection of the environment, energy production, 
trade policy, and industrial policy. A third important area of govern-
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ment activity is institution building. Yet another area of government 
impact is deregulation, a subset of regulatory reform, which is defined 
as the “complete or partial elimination of regulation in a sector to 
improve economic performance.”12 The Somali case presents an oppo-
site extreme situation, wherein the government and its institutions dis-
appeared physically and also from the collective consciousness of the 
Somalis. Pearce tries to identify and isolate “governmental effects from 
other societal practices and expectations,” and comes to the conclu-
sion that the way out is “to study those unusual circumstances where 
governments have changed, forcing other institutions and expectations 
to adapt to them.”13 In Somalia the state itself ceased to exist, and by 
definition no government can exist where there is no state.
In the classical distinction between state and government, the for-
mer is a “durable institutional structure that embodies legal institu-
tional order within a national territory.”14 The latter is “a group of 
decision makers that holds state power for a limited tenure.”15 States 
evolve slowly, except in the face of sweeping social revolutions that 
take place rarely.16 Governments, however, come and go, bringing new 
initiatives and repealing and reinterpreting old ones.
Pearce calls governments that do not set up or enforce the rule of 
law non-facilitative, which means that, “they do not support or enable 
companies, firms, or other types of collectives that establish and pur-
sue their own goals.”17 In this framework, the lack of government in 
Somalia could be considered a special case of a facilitative situation. 
Any governmental regulatory regime is going to be, by necessity, ex 
post. Private businesses in Somalia can set regulatory examples, which 
could eventually form the basis for the necessary and ex post regula-
tory regime that the future government will have to establish. Such 
a regulatory regime will most likely have fewer constraints on entre-
preneurship and freedom—a most necessary condition for economic 
development according to Sen.18
Government regulations are indispensable for the conduct of busi-
ness, such as those that deal with property rights, contracts, and 
trusts.19 First, through their definition of private property, governments 
demarcate the nature and scope of economies. Second, governments 
use mechanisms like currency and price supports, which are essential 
for the conduct of economies. Third, governments intervene in the 
allocation of financial, human, and social capital resources in which 
private property rights have been created. Governments also intervene 
by regulating trade in property in ways that may create entry and exit 
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barriers. According to Demsetz, “property rights are an instrument of 
society and derive their significance from the fact that they help man 
form those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings 
with others.”20
Government intervention should alter the behavior of economic 
actors to make them more trustworthy in their dealings with one 
another. The building of trust starts with the government itself if it 
succeeds in eliminating, or at least reducing, corruption. Governments 
and states vary widely in the ways they intervene in the economy. 
States and governments also directly provide goods and services. It is 
one of the main functions of states and governments to help create jobs 
and foster growth in various sectors of the economy. States also have 
distributive, regulative, and redistributive functions.
Industries evolve through the development of technologies (or 
their adoption) and institutions, and through continuous interactions 
among many players in the government and marketplace. Businesses 
and industry arrangements are predicated on national political insti-
tutional structures. Jepperson has presented a model employing four 
archetypes, based on policy networks emanating from the interplay 
and interactions between state and society.21 According to Jepperson’s 
taxonomy, political institutional structures can be defined along two 
dimensions: “collective agency” and “organization of society.” Collec-
tive agency has to do with how the state derives its authority intrin-
sically or from society. Along this dimension, two types of polities 
can be differentiated: state-centric and society-centered. In state-centric 
polities, as the name implies, the government guides and directs busi-
ness and industrial activities, and derives its authority from the state. 
In society-centered polities, the government derives its authority and 
legitimacy from the social contract as a representative of the people.
The second dimension, organization of society, can also be conceptual-
ized on two levels: associational and corporatist. Associational societ-
ies are those in which basic units of interest representation comprise 
connections among individuals, whereas in corporatist societies the 
connections are among groups rather than individuals. In other words, 
associational societies are individualistic while corporatist ones are col-
lectivistic. Because of their individualistic nature, associational societies 
focus on individual rights and choices, and corporatist societies focus on 
collective requirements and duties.21
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In terms of business and industrial entrepreneurship, societal and 
corporatist institutional arrangements have the tendency to opt for 
“bricolage.” Bricolage is a term coined by Garud and Karnoe as part 
of a taxonomy to characterize technological entrepreneurship, but it is 
also applicable in industry formation in general.22 According to Garud 
and Karnoe, bricolage entrepreneurship proceeds through a series 
of small wins to create and then improve a technology, business, or 
industry. They contrast bricolage with breakthrough, in which individ-
ual actors compete to achieve technological progress in one great leap. 
The latter method is preferred by statist and associational institutional 
arrangements. This attitude also affects the government’s business and 
industry development orientation. Diffusion orientation, as contrasted 
with mission orientation, is more consistent with social and corporatist 
institutional arrangements.
Applying the above taxonomy and analysis to the situation in 
Somalia, a social corporatist institutional arrangement would better 
fit the present needs of the country. Thus, the state institutions would 
play a facilitative role, and the government would act as a protector 
and partner of business and industry, but would not necessarily lead 
new industry formation or expansion. In such a situation, state and 
government institutional arrangements would have a diffusion policy 
orientation, and employ bricolage entrepreneurial and new industry 
formation approaches.
IV. The Regulatory Climate
Recently the World Bank undertook a number of studies that culmi-
nated in the publication of the “Doing Business” series. To date, the 
first two books of the series have been published: Doing Business in 
2004 and Doing Business in 2005. Together the two studies, which were 
carried out in 145 countries, identified and collected data, and ana-
lyzed seven indicators of government regulations that directly impact 
business activities. The indicators apply to (1) starting a business, (2) 
hiring and firing workers, (3) registering property, (4) obtaining credit, 
(5) protecting investors, (6) enforcing contracts, and (7) closing a busi-
ness. These indicators have important implications for capital and 
labor productivities, unemployment, poverty, attraction of domestic 
and foreign private investments, corruption, and the relative sizes of 
the formal and informal economies—and thus the efficacy of govern-
ment tax collection.
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In numerous poor countries, business regulations make it so hard 
to start a business that many entrepreneurs are forced into the infor-
mal economy, where they do not have to pay taxes or give benefits to 
their workers. If they resist the allure of the informal economy and go 
through all the hurdles of registering their new business, they then 
have to grapple with regulations dealing with hiring and firing work-
ers. Rigid hiring and firing regulations force businesses to hire work-
ers “under the table,” with all of the attendant abuses of the informal 
economy.
Besides simplifying rules dealing with starting a business and hir-
ing and firing workers, the third area governments should focus on is 
simple and straightforward regulations for the registration and protec-
tion of property rights. Entrepreneurs are less willing to invest where 
property rights are not secure. Protection of property rights links effort 
with reward. The second report of the World Bank found that the more 
bureaucratic and cumbersome property regulations are in a country, 
the more property disputes there are, bribes that businesses have to 
pay are more prevalent, and entrepreneurs and businesses keep more 
assets in the informal sector.23 If cumbersome regulations force busi-
ness people to keep their properties in the informal sector, it is harder 
for them to get credit since they cannot use their unregistered proper-
ties as collateral.
The fourth indicator is obtaining credit. The World Bank cites a 
number of studies that point out simple policies that governments can 
promulgate in order to facilitate the procurement of credit for busi-
nesses.23 Among them are making access to credit easier, creating credit 
registries that sort good borrowers from bad ones, and putting in place 
laws to enforce collateral and debt collection, and bankruptcy.
The alternative to debt financing is equity financing, a proposi-
tion that is more appropriate in a country like Somalia, with its reli-
gion-inspired aversion to interest-bearing loans. Both equity and debt 
financing require robust legal protection for their proper functioning. 
Thus, the fifth indicator is investor protection, without which equity 
investment remains a risky endeavor and the sources of such invest-
ments will be limited to immediate family members, close relatives, 
and friends. The study points out three areas of investor protection: (1) 
disclosure of financial information for individuals and firms seeking 
investment; (2) legal protection of small investors; and (3) enforcement 
capabilities in the courts.
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Enforcing contracts, the sixth indicator, will also require efficient 
and well-functioning business courts, involving fewer procedures, a 
shorter time to resolve disputes, and more efficient judges of good 
repute and integrity. Finally, the studies identify a number of impor-
tant reforms that could improve the seventh indicator, the closure of 
businesses. Making it easier to close nonproductive businesses will 
free scarce human and financial resources to be put to more productive 
use elsewhere.
Both World Bank studies emphasize that the regulatory burdens 
that businesses have to bear in poor countries are higher than those 
in rich countries. These regulatory burdens tend to push businesses 
in poor countries into the informal economy, which accounts for over 
40% of the overall economy in those countries. The studies maintain 
that in developing countries, government red tape presents a signifi-
cant hindrance to economic growth. The more red tape a country has 
in place and the more cumbersome the regulations, the more likely 
they are to foster graft and corruption, which in turn hamper economic 
development in poor countries.
Transparency International, a non-governmental organization 
devoted to curbing corruption, has been ranking countries each year 
since 1993 on how corrupt their governments are perceived to be. 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) mea-
sures “the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among 
public officials and politicians.” Corruption is defined as the abuse of 
public office for private gain. In this year’s report, Transparency Inter-
national estimates that corruption costs the world economy at least 
$400 billion per year.24 With the exception of Djibouti and Somalia, 
which were not ranked this year, all members of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (consisting of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda) are included among the 60 most 
corrupt countries in the world, out of 146. Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Sudan, and Uganda scored less than three out of a clean score of ten. 
The report recommends that the best way to fight corruption is to 
require transparency on the part of both governments and multina-
tional corporations in public procurement. The report takes to task the 
developed world and its multinationals for not doing enough to curb 
corruption.
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V. The Investment Climate
Although the investment climate is a subset of the business regulatory 
climate, it deserves separate treatment because of its crucial importance 
for attracting and keeping domestic and international entrepreneurs. 
The World Bank defines investment climate as “the location-specific 
factors that shape the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest 
productively, create jobs, and expand.”25 A good investment climate is 
essential for growth as well as poverty reduction. By removing unnec-
essary costs, thereby lessening risks and barriers to competition, gov-
ernments can create an ambiance in which entrepreneurs feel secure 
to invest in job creating businesses. Before they decide whether and 
where to invest, both domestic and international investors scrutinize 
government policies and behaviors as a whole package. They look at 
property rights, taxes, finance, infrastructure, and corruption. Hav-
ing the requisite formal policies in place is not enough; they have 
to be matched by government practice. Arbitrary regulation and lack 
of microeconomic discipline on the part of the government can scare 
away potential investors.
The World Bank identifies four basic areas that comprise a good 
investment climate. First, securing political and macroeconomic stabil-
ity, without which none of the other policies will take root. Thus, one 
of the first tasks the new government has to tackle is reconciliation 
and the return or compensation of properties unlawfully expropriated 
during the civil war. The rights to land and other properties have to be 
verified because they may have changed hands many times since their 
initial confiscation.
Second, governments should put in place regulation and taxation 
that ensures the reconciliation of the interests of firms and the broader 
social needs of the general public. Third, governments should help fos-
ter financial markets and infrastructure that connect firms with lenders 
and investors. Fourth, they should establish educational systems that 
can produce a workforce equipped with the necessary skills for a mod-
ern economy.
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VI. The Civil War and What it has Wrought
Despite the anarchy and extensive destruction that ensued soon after 
Siyaad Barre was ousted in a popular revolt, and notwithstanding the 
lawlessness and insecurity that became an integral part of the land-
scape in Somalia, businesses have boomed and many services that 
were hard to obtain during Barre’s 21-year near-monopoly of the 
public sector have become readily available to those who can afford 
them.26 The highly risky business environment has not deterred enter-
prising domestic and foreign firms from investing in Somalia. The civil 
war transformed the Somalis from people who fifteen years ago were 
dependent on an all-encompassing and stiflingly pervasive govern-
ment into entrepreneurs imbued with initiative and acute business 
savoir-faire. Thus in some respects, the absence of a central government 
turned out to be a blessing in disguise. It has unfettered the entrepre-
neurial spirit of the Somali people in a way that no one could have 
foreseen.
Private clinics, hospitals, health care centers, and pharmacies have 
sprung up everywhere. Private schools at all levels have been estab-
lished and staffed—some with outside help, others with local initiative 
and resources. There are numerous universities and institutes in the 
capital city, all of which opened their doors to students in the last six 
to seven years. The universities offer courses from Arabic and Islamic 
Shari’ah to business administration and computer science. (These edu-
cational institutions suffer from a dearth of qualified instructors and 
severe scarcity of other resources, unfortunately, and cannot accommo-
date even half of the students who apply for admission every year.)
The business and educational achievements, however, come at an 
enormous price. Impressive they may be, but the attained successes 
have to be weighed against the devastation to the collective body 
and soul that the Somali people have endured since 1991. No pub-
lic building, utility, or infrastructure has escaped the blatant thievery 
and unabashed greed of clan militias, unaffiliated robbers, and lawless 
thugs that roamed the streets of Somalia. The physical environment has 
suffered much damage. The scant and irreplaceable trees of the Somali 
semi-desert have been uprooted and burned into charcoal for domestic 
consumption and exportation to the insatiable markets of the Middle 
East. There have been widespread rumors that some warlords were 
bribed to allow dumping of hazardous wastes in parts of Somalia.
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The business and educational successes attained during the civil 
war also have to be weighed against the opportunity costs arising 
from the insecure climate within which Somali businesses operated. 
The risky business and investment climate allows for only “bazaar-
type” business relationships, a situation not known to have ever led 
to economic development. The lack of government regulatory protec-
tion precludes long-term investments and long-term business deal-
ings, without which the economy will not develop beyond subsistence 
level.
VI. Recent Developments: The Islamic Courts
Siyaad Barre’s government collapsed following a popular armed upris-
ing in 1991. Within ten months, state institutions crumbled during what 
the Somalis in Mogadishu call “the four-month war,” when the two 
faction leaders, General Aideed and Mr. Ali Mahdi, could not agree 
to share power. This culminated in an all-out war fought in the streets 
of Mogadishu. That was when the real civil war began, and although 
the rest of the country had its own local armed confrontations, nothing 
matched the civil strife in the Old Benadir region (Mogadishu, Lower 
and Central Shabelle) in its intensity, brutality, and destruction.
It is not by accident that the most devastated parts of the city are 
mostly state buildings, whether government offices, schools, univer-
sities, hospitals, or factories. Somalia was not a state before the Brit-
ish, French, and Italians gradually occupied the country in the 19th 
century. State institutions were thus a novelty to the Somalis. In fact, 
in the Somali mind there is no distinction between the state and the 
government. To the average Somali (i.e., the generation that knew no 
government other than Siyaad Barre’s), the government was the state. 
Therefore, during the anarchy that followed the “four-month war” in 
Mogadishu, state buildings and properties were not only thoroughly 
looted but destroyed as well. The jagged remains of such famous build-
ings as the old parliament, the new parliament, and the socialist-era 
monuments all testify to the pent-up destructive anger unleashed by 
the fall of the Siyaad Barre regime.
The only institutions that have survived the civil war, albeit not 
totally intact, are the religion of Islam (embodied in the mosques and 
religious schools) and kinship structures. In fact, one may argue that 
the areas that were spared extensive damage were those where the 
kin structure was not thoroughly poisoned by Siyaad Barre’s destruc-
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tive kin policies. Mogadishu being the capital, the kin structure was 
thoroughly compromised by the time Siyaad Barre was chased out 
of the city. The religion of Islam fared slightly better than the kinship 
structure, but it was not strong enough to withstand the ruinous forces 
unleashed by the collapse of the regime. And it was these two home-
grown institutions that came to the rescue in April 2006, when the 
warlords finally overstepped their limits by declaring that they would 
round up all “terrorists” and hand them over to the United States.
The main reason that all the previous attempts at reconciliation in 
Somalia failed rests with the warlords, who had profiteered from the 
civil war. It was clear from the beginning that the warlords would 
always try to find a pretext to oppose whatever system the Somali peo-
ple agreed on. The ill intentions of the warlords became evident when 
they started using their subversive tactics as soon as they returned to 
Mogadishu in 2004 from the last reconciliation conference in Nairobi, 
Kenya. All the agreements they had signed were thrown out the win-
dow. The warlords resumed their old ways of disruption, intimidation, 
extortion, and plain brutality, as if the two years spent on the rec-
onciliation conference in Kenya were an aberration. The Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) located itself first in Jowhar, the capital 
of the Middle Shabelle region, just northeast of the national capital. 
Then it moved to Baidoa, the capital of the Bay region, northwest of 
the capital. The TFG, however, has been ineffective in both of the two 
locations.
In this bleak situation arose the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). No 
one, least of all the people who formed the UIC, expected the meteoric 
rise to power of this ragtag group of Islamic warriors. According to 
many eyewitness accounts, everything happened almost by accident. 
Less than a year ago, a group comprising the most vicious warlords 
formed an organization they called the Alliance for the Elimination 
of Terrorism and the Restoration of Peace (in Somali, Isbahaysiga la 
Dagaallanka Argagaxisada iyo Nabad Soo Celinta). Furthermore, the Alli-
ance’s relationship with the U.S. was never a secret. In fact, the Alliance 
openly boasted that it got its funding and armaments from the U.S.
This was the situation until February 2006. That fateful day the 
warlords finally crossed the line. The proverbial “straw that broke the 
camel’s back” took the form of an announcement promulgated by an 
alliance of warlords, which amounted to a declaration of war against 
the religious leadership of the capital. That was the tipping point. In 
the inevitable war that ensued, the religious leadership, in the form of 
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militias guided by the Islamic Courts, defeated the combined forces of 
all the warlords. The last pocket of resistance, which was holed up on 
the main campus of the National University, was finally overcome on 
July 9, 2006. The remaining institutional buildings were surrendered 
peacefully.
What has happened in Somalia recently was a genuine revolution 
spearheaded by a new phenomenon called Islamic Shari’ah courts, 
which were founded on kin structures. Because the anarchy and chaos 
were lasting indefinitely and the warlords barred every initiative to 
bring some kind of order to Mogadishu, clan-based neighborhoods 
got together and formed Islamic Shari’ah courts to protect themselves 
from the freelance militias who thrived on extortion, robbery, and 
rape. Quickly the idea took off in neighborhood after neighborhood. 
The militias that the Islamic courts used for their police operations 
were borrowed from kin militias and those attached to businesses. 
Thus, it could happen that a fighter would belong to a business mili-
tia and join court police operations when needed. This fluid situation 
was galvanized by the announcement of the Alliance. The neighbor-
hood Islamic Courts, which by then formed a unified system, got the 
spark they needed when the Alliance labeled individuals active in the 
Islamic Courts movement as terrorists, and declared that they would 
be rounded up and handed over to America. This single declaration 
united the disparate groupings that comprised the Islamic Courts.
The now temporary stabilization that the Islamic Courts brought 
to the central and strategic Benadir region (Mogadishu, the national 
capital, and the Lower and Middle Shabelle) could not have come at a 
more opportune time for the Somali people. Alas, that possibility has 
since been extinguished by the military intervention of Ethiopia.
VII. Where to Start, What to Do?
What Somalia needs is a strong government that fosters and protects 
both the economic and physical environments. The new Somali gov-
ernment should at a minimum focus on two functions of good govern-
ment: designing proper business regulations in general, and creating 
a business climate that fosters investment in particular. Without these 
regulations in place, a new government will have a difficult time cre-
ating job opportunities for the Somali people, especially the youth (a 
panacea for the establishment of lasting security). Political stability 
will not be possible without creating legitimate job opportunities to 
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lure the unemployed youth that now swell the ranks of the private 
militias. The following sections will expand on these two functions.
A new government would not have to repeal any formal business 
laws. In today’s Somalia, there are no formal laws; everything is in 
the informal sector. A new government will be starting out with a 
clean slate, with minimal red tape, unless it chooses to reinstitute the 
draconian gridlock of the Siyaad Barre regime or go back even fur-
ther to colonial era laws. (Most developing countries still have on the 
books rules that the colonial powers deliberately designed in order to 
discourage indigenous entrepreneurship.) Business regulations, how-
ever, will need to be promulgated for protecting property rights and 
the environment, for granting titles, and for establishing fair courts 
that can enforce contracts and debt payments. It is essential that these 
regulations, so fundamental to economic development, be kept to the 
absolute minimum necessary. Once a rule is on the books it is not easy 
to repeal or reform it. A new government has to balance the need to 
provide incentives and encouragement for investment with the need to 
protect the interests of society at large. This balancing act is an ongoing 
process of improvement that requires regular review and adjustment 
of policies.
The provision of the public good is a most important function. It 
comes as no surprise that this is the area of public life that suffered the 
most in the absence of a central government. Left to its own devices, 
the market cannot look after the public good. In its broadest sense, 
the public good includes ensuring security of property through the 
establishment of the rule of law and the independence of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government. This requires the creation 
and maintenance of such institutions as courts, a police force, and 
prisons. It is incumbent on the new government to have sound fiscal 
and monetary policies, which are hard to maintain for any government 
without a robust and independent central bank. With such institutions 
in place, the new government will be able to curb the excesses of the 
market—what economists call internalizing externalities.
According to conventional wisdom, it takes many years to estab-
lish the institutions that are so indispensable for sustainable economic 
development. Recently, however, two studies have suggested that an 
initial economic growth spurt may be achieved through small, piece-
meal policy changes, which in turn may lead to long-term institutional 
reforms.27 The examples cited include the protection of property rights 
reforms that Deng Xiaoping introduced into China in 1978, which 
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directly led to China’s unprecedented economic growth. Similarly, 
reforms implemented by General Park’s regime in South Korea pro-
vided the necessary impetus for the boom in private investment in that 
country. General Pinochet did something similar for Chile in 1983. In 
all three countries these simple reforms led to more fundamental ones, 
which in turn ensured the successful continuation of economic devel-
opment. The end results are visible to all.
A new government’s efforts should be prioritized, gradual, and 
incremental. It should build on the few institutions already in existence 
in the country that established positive track records during the civil 
war. New regulations, processes, and institutions should be introduced 
on a need basis and not under the prescription of policies developed 
somewhere else or developed for some other country, regardless of 
how that country appears to be similar to Somalia.
One of the top priorities of the new government must be the protec-
tion of the environment. The market cannot take care of preserving the 
environment and controlling pollution without active governmental 
intervention. Passing and enforcing laws banning the exportation of 
charcoal is indispensable. In the longer term, domestic use of charcoal 
should also be curtailed in urban areas. This cannot be done unless 
the government makes it a high priority to develop modern cooking 
methods, especially those that utilize solar energy and wind power. At 
the present rate of charcoal production, in which irreplaceable trees are 
cut down and converted into charcoal, Somalia will turn into a barren 
desert in less than a generation.
The Somali countryside does not have plenty of trees, but it has 
plenty of sunshine. In the absence of an effective government, elec-
tricity production relies exclusively on fossil fuel burning, 100% of 
which has to be imported. In the last few decades, the technologies 
that underpin electricity production based on solar energy and wind 
power have made dramatic advances, rendering such energy alterna-
tives much more affordable in developing countries.
Economic reconstruction will entail repairing and rebuilding the 
basic infrastructure. The few remaining examples of infrastructure are 
in total disuse and decay. Roads, soil health, water for irrigation, drink-
ing water, sanitation, and modern cooking fuels will have to be the 
primary areas of concentration for a new government. In addition, 
basic health care concerns, such as TB, childhood diseases, childbirth, 
nutrition, and control of malaria, should be addressed. Finally, the new 
government has to put in place accreditation processes for the private 
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schools that at present provide primary and secondary education in 
the absence of state-owned schools. A skilled labor force is a sine qua 
non for a modern economy, and proper education is the main ingredi-
ent of such a force.
Somalia needs a strong, corruption-free, and accountable govern-
ment. Accountability requires transparency, which cannot occur with-
out freedom of expression and a free press. Only a government that 
encourages these qualities will be able to create an environment in 
which people can become more productive. Every report on economic 
development emphasizes that there are no economic ills that a good 
government cannot remedy. Corruption and misuse of public funds 
have denied Somalia and other developing countries the economic 
development they sorely need and deserve.
VIII. Conclusion
As other contributions in this volume have emphasized, whichever 
government establishes itself in Somalia will have the daunting task of 
reintroducing security and stability into a country where internecine 
bloodshed and irredentism have become a way of life for more than 
a decade and a half. But a new government may also have a good 
chance to succeed in implementing the necessary government policies 
and behaviors for economic reconstruction and growth. It is not going 
to inherit bad policies that ought to be reformed or scrapped. There 
is a dire need, however, for government regulations essential for the 
stewardship of a modern economy. The government should resist the 
temptation to import regulations from other countries or policies put 
together by consultants or non-governmental organizations that are 
not well versed in the intricacies of the Somali situation. It should also 
resist dismantling homegrown institutions because of unfounded for-
eign claims that they pose a security threat to one country or another. 
Instead, a new government may wish to build on some of the worthy 
wartime institutions that the Somali people themselves established, 
often without outside assistance. Building on those institutions will 
create a sense of ownership and continuity, two ingredients essential 
for the success of state building.
One lesson that the Somalis learned from their long and costly civil 
war is that they can accomplish many things without a government. 
Other experiences taught them that there are an array of challenges 
that are impossible to tackle without an effective central authority. The 
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job of any new government is to strike a fine balance between these 
two experiences: to get out of the way of the people in the former, and 
to ensure a pervasive presence in the latter.
A new government should not try to reinvent the wheel. There is a 
sizeable, readily accessible body of knowledge in the world about how 
best to create the necessary environment for economic reconstruction 
and sustainable development. The new government should solicit the 
advice of people who have the requisite knowledge and expertise. 
Under their supervision, it should judiciously choose and implement 
the most applicable policies, benchmarking the performance of applied 
policies against comparable countries that preceded the Somali Repub-
lic on the path to development and economic prosperity. It is the duty 
of Somali scholars to ensure that well-researched policy alternatives 
are available to a new government. The duty of a new government is 
to accord serious and careful consideration to the suggestions put for-
ward, and act on them.
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